Revocation of the driving licence. Void if the administration is inactive.

By an application filed before the Justice of the Peace of Bari, Mr XXX, represented by Attorney Pasquale Trigiante and Attorney Alessandra Casamassima, challenged the order revoking his driving licence, having been found driving his own car during the period of suspension of the licence.

In the case, Mr XXX was charged on 3 January 2016 with breach of Article 186, paragraph 2, letter C, of the Highway Code, having been found driving under the influence of alcohol, and provisional suspension of the licence for 12 months was ordered. On 29 February 2016, however, the applicant was found driving during the period of suspension of the licence. Subsequently, on 3 January 2017, once the 12-month suspension had expired, the driving licence was returned.

The applicant, legitimately relying on a favourable conclusion of the administrative procedure, was therefore able to drive for several months, until, unexpectedly, on 15 July 2017 the revocation of the licence was served. That order was therefore served on the applicant more than one year and six months after the breach.

The defence objected that, even if not expressly indicated by Article 219 of the Highway Code, the time limit for adopting the revocation order cannot be left to the unfettered discretion of the public administration which, on the contrary, under Article 2 of Law 241/90 has a general duty to conclude administrative procedures within 90 days, all the more so if one considers the period of two or three years for obtaining a new licence provided for by Article 219, paragraph III-bis, of the Highway Code.

The Justice of the Peace of Bari, accepting the defence argument, decided as follows:

"allows the challenge and, accordingly, annuls order-injunction no. XXX, issued by the Prefect of the Province of XXX on 27 June 2017. Orders the Prefecture, in the person of the Prefect for the time being, to pay the costs of the proceedings in favour of the applicant, assessed at €774.00 in total, plus 15%, VAT and the lawyers' welfare contribution".

The Justice of the Peace, by reasoning which is entirely to be shared, gave the following reasons:

"indeed, the time which elapsed between the commission of the offence and the adoption of the order revoking the licence appears to the court unduly long, in that, without reasons, a timescale relating to an order which would have interfered with that relating to the suspension was extended. The adoption of the order, and the consequent service, which took place at a time which was not close, cannot but amount to a defect in the act which undermines its lawfulness, because an administrative act is a legal entity directed at the pursuit of public purposes — which affect the sphere of the addressee of the act — and which, in the present case, do not find immediate implementation and correspondence within a period of time regarded as appropriate".